Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Antitrust Series
Year 

Paper 

Antitrust and Competition Law Update:
Important Changes to U.S. Antitrust Statutes
Become Law
William Kolasky∗

∗

WilmerHale
This working paper is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be commercially reproduced without the permission of the copyright holder.
http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art25
Copyright c 2004 by the author.

Antitrust and Competition Law Update:
Important Changes to U.S. Antitrust Statutes
Become Law
William Kolasky

Abstract

On June 22, 2004, President Bush signed into law perhaps the most signi?cant
amendments to the U.S. antitrust statutes since the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976. These changes, enacted as H.R. 1086, will have substantial implications for several areas of antitrust enforcement. These include:
• limiting potential civil actions against standard-setting organizations;increasing
even further incentives for antitrust wrongdoers to participate in the Antitrust Division’s corporate leniency program; increasing criminal penalties for corporations
and individuals; and enhancing judicial scrutiny of antitrust consent decrees.
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Important Changes to U.S. Antitrust Statutes
Become Law

O

n June 22, 2004, President Bush signed
into law perhaps the most signiﬁcant
amendments to the U.S. antitrust
statutes since the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976. These changes,
enacted as H.R. 1086, will have substantial
implications for several areas of antitrust enforcement. These include:
•

limiting potential civil actions against
standard-setting organizations;

•

increasing even further incentives for
antitrust wrongdoers to participate in the
Antitrust Division’s corporate leniency
program;

•

increasing criminal penalties for corporations and individuals; and

•

enhancing judicial scrutiny of antitrust
consent decrees.

Standards Development Organization
Advancement Act of 2004
In the United States, private “standard-setting
organizations” often develop industry technical
standards that enhance quality and safety and
reduce costs. Through the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004,
Congress has sought to address concerns that the
threat of treble-damage antitrust actions -- for
example, by suppliers of equipment that does not
meet industry standards -- may be chilling the
development of socially beneﬁcial standards.
The legislation amends the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993
(NCRPA), 15 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq., to limit the
potential civil liability of “Standard Development
Organizations” (SDO) in certain circumstances.
The legislation limits awards against SDOs in
federal or state antitrust suits to actual (rather
than treble) damages and attorneys’ fees and
costs, if:
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•

•

the SDO provides the Federal Trade Commission and Attorney General with timely
written notice disclosing (a) its name and
principal place of business; and (b) documents showing the nature and scope of its
standard-setting activities; and

Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement
and Reform Act of 2004
The bill also included the Antitrust Criminal
Penalty Enforcement and Reform Act of 2004.
This Act has important implications for cartels
and related civil actions; criminal penalties for antitrust violations; and the process by which courts
approve Department of Justice consent decrees.

the antitrust claim results from conduct
within the scope of the notiﬁcation.

In addition to the single-damages provision, the
legislation beneﬁts SDOs by (a) specifying that all
antitrust claims against them shall be judged under
the rule of reason; and (b) providing that SDOs
prevailing in litigation may recover attorneys’ fees
and costs if the court determines that the claim or
the plaintiff’s conduct during the litigation “was
frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation or in
bad faith.”

Cartels and Related Civil Actions
Since 1993, the DoJ’s Antitrust Division has
operated a “Corporate Leniency Program,” under
which DoJ grants immunity from criminal prosecution to corporations (and their ofﬁcers, directors, and employees) that are the ﬁrst in the door
to self-report conduct (usually cartels) that violates
the antitrust laws. By creating strong incentives
for cartel participants to blow the whistle and thus
destabilize antitrust conspiracies, the leniency
program has been instrumental in dramatically
increasing the number of cartels that DoJ has been
able to prosecute successfully.

Although the legislation provides some relief
for SDOs, there are very important limitations
on its effects. The legislation explicitly limits
its relief only to SDOs themselves and their
full-time employees. Unlike the NCRPA provisions relating to research and production joint
ventures, the legislation does nothing to protect
corporations (or their employees) that participate
in standard-setting activities. Given the central
role that industry participants play in these activities, this limitation raises questions whether the
Act will achieve its goal of preventing antitrust
exposure from chilling beneﬁcial standard setting activities.

The Antitrust Division was concerned, however, that the prospect of treble-damage civil lawsuits was dissuading some antitrust wrongdoers
from participating in the program. In particular,
cartel participants had to weigh the beneﬁts of
immunity from criminal prosecution against the
strong likelihood of federal and state treble-damage claims based on their admitted wrongdoing.
Furthermore, leniency program participants might
ﬁnd themselves liable not only for triple the damages suffered by customers that they dealt with,
but also for three-times the damages to their coconspirators’ customers under joint and several
liability rules.

Further, the legislation expressly excludes
from its protections speciﬁed conduct that falls
outside the scope of legitimate “standards development activity.” This includes exchanges
of information among competitors relating to
“cost, sales, proﬁtability, prices, marketing, or
distribution” that is not reasonably required to
develop or assess conformity with standards;
market allocation agreements; and agreements
to ﬁx prices.
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To address these concerns, the legislation limits the total private civil liability of corporations
that have entered into leniency agreements with
the Antitrust Division (combined with that of their
ofﬁcers, directors, and employees who are covered
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by the agreement) to actual damages “attributable
to the commerce done by the applicant in the
goods or services affected by the violation” (i.e.,
single damages), plus attorneys’ fees, costs, and
interest. This limitation applies both to federal
claims under Section 1 or 3 of the Sherman Act
and to claims brought under similar state laws.
(The legislation will cease to have effect in ﬁve
years unless Congress re-enacts it.)

ously to consider applying for leniency under the
Corporate Leniency Program to obtain amnesty
from criminal prosecution. Given the prospects
for relief from civil damages and the increased
criminal penalties (see below) that the legislation
creates, they now have even greater incentive to
apply for leniency.

Notably, under the legislation, leniency
program participants are no longer jointly and
severally liable for damages suffered by their
co-conspirators’ customers. The legislation will,
conversely, increase the potential liability for cartel participants that do not obtain leniency because
they may be jointly and severally liable for twotimes the actual damages suffered by customers
of the leniency applicant, which that wrongdoer
has avoided through its cooperation.

The legislation also dramatically increases potential criminal penalties for violations of Section
1 of the Sherman Act. Congress’s stated purpose
here was to make criminal penalties for antitrust
offenses more consistent with the harsh -- and
arguably draconian -- penalties for white collar
offenses that Sarbanes-Oxley and other recent
legislation established. Maximum penalties are
increased as follows:

Enhanced Criminal Penalties

This relief comes at some price to the leniency program participant, however. While program participants have always been required to
cooperate closely with the Antitrust Division, to
obtain the beneﬁt of reduced damage exposure
they must also cooperate with private plaintiffs.
In particular, the trial court must determine that
the corporation (and any individuals covered by
the leniency agreement) has provided “satisfactory cooperation to the claimant with respect to
the civil action.” The corporation and individuals
must (a) “provid[e] a full account to the claimant
of all facts” known to them that “are potentially
relevant to the civil action” and (b) “furnish[] all
documents or other items potentially relevant to
the civil action” in their possession, custody, or
control “wherever they are located.” Additionally,
cooperating individuals must sit for any interviews, depositions, or testimony that the plaintiff
reasonably requests and must respond completely
and truthfully to all questions the plaintiff asks.
The corporation must use its best efforts to secure
and facilitate the cooperation of its personnel.

criminal ﬁnes for corporations from $10
million to $100 million;

•

criminal ﬁnes for individuals from $350,000
to $1 million; and

•

prison sentences from three to ten years.

Although the legislation itself only increases
maximum penalties, we expect the U.S. Sentencing
Commission to increase sentencing guideline ranges in accordance with the increased maximums, as
it did with the Sarbanes-Oxley amendments.
The Criminal Fines Improvements Act of 1987,
18 U.S.C. § 3571, already provides that a court
may impose, as an alternative to the maximum
ﬁne set forth in the Sherman Act, a ﬁne equal to
twice the gain or loss caused by the crime. Accordingly, at least for ﬁnes against corporations,
the amendment’s most signiﬁcant effect will be
to relieve the government of the need to prove the
gain or loss attributable to an antitrust wrongdoer’s
conduct in order to obtain a ﬁne over $10 million.
Although most ﬁnes result from plea agreements,
the government’s (often difﬁcult) burden of proving
the amount of gain or loss in a contested case has

Companies that have participated in antitrust
violations have always been well-advised seri-
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always limited its leverage in plea negotiations.
Now the government will not need to prove the
amount of gain or loss unless it is seeking a ﬁne
of over $100 million, which is rarely the case. As
a practical matter, this will substantially increase
the government’s bargaining power in plea negotiations with corporate defendants.

1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the D.C. Circuit overruled
the district court’s refusal to enter a consent decree between the United States and Microsoft and
observed that, unless an antitrust consent decree
would “make a mockery of the judicial power,”
the “Tunney Act cannot be interpreted as an authorization for a district judge to assume the role
of attorney general.” Id. at 1462.

The amendments also mean that individuals
convicted of antitrust offenses are likely to spend
much more time in jail. Unfortunately, Congress
failed to hold any hearings or otherwise undertake
any reasoned public analysis to determine whether
current sentences for antitrust offenses have proven
inadequate to meet goals of deterrence, retribution,
or incapacitation.

With the new legislation, Congress has tried to
clarify that district courts are to undertake a more
thorough, independent determination whether a
proposed consent decree is in the public interest.
To that effect, Congress made ﬁndings that:

Finally, we note that the Supreme Court’s
decision last week in Blakely v. Washington may
have important implications for the sentencing of
both individuals and corporations convicted of
antitrust violations. That decision sharply limits
the factors that a court may take into account in
sentencing that were not proven to a jury or admitted by the defendant. It remains to be seen exactly
how Blakely will affect sentencing in antitrust and
other areas where courts have traditionally relied
on facts -- such as the amount of loss resulting from
the offense -- that were not proven to the jury or
admitted by the defendant.

“[the] purpose of the Tunney Act was to
ensure that the entry of antitrust consent
judgments is in the public interest”; and

•

“it would misconstrue the meaning of the
Congressional intent in enacting the Tunney
Act to limit the discretion of district courts
to review antitrust judgments solely to determining whether entry of those consent
judgments would make a ‘mockery of the
judicial function.’”

In addition, Congress changed the Tunney
Act’s language that the court “may” consider an
enumerated list of factors in determining whether
to enter a proposed consent judgment to a command that the court “shall” consider those factors.
The factors that courts now must consider, which
the legislation modiﬁed slightly from the original
Tunney Act, are:

Amendments to Tunney Act
The Tunney Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 16,
requires that the Department of Justice publish
for public comment proposed consent judgments,
and that courts determine whether the proposal is
“in the public interest” before entering judgment.
In recent years, however, some have expressed
concern that the courts have been “rubber stamping” consent decrees without subjecting them to
signiﬁcant independent review.

(a) the competitive impact of such judgment,
including termination of alleged violations,
provisions for enforcement and modiﬁcation, duration or relief sought, anticipated
effects of alternative remedies actually
considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and other competitive considerations
bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment that the court deems necessary to a
determination of whether the consent judgment is in the public interest; and

This concern grew largely out of decisions of
the D.C. Circuit that construed narrowly the district
courts’ authority to reject consent decrees. Most
prominently, in United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d
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mit anyone to intervene.” We believe, however,
that the amendments will, at the margin, probably
introduce more uncertainty into the process of negotiating consent decrees with the Justice Department. They may also create more opportunities for
parties opposed to consent decrees to receive fuller
consideration from district courts or perhaps obtain
concessions from settling parties that wish to avoid
contested Tunney Act proceedings.

(b) the impact of entry of such judgment
upon competition in the relevant market
or markets, upon the public generally and
individuals alleging speciﬁc injury from the
violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the public beneﬁt, if
any, to be derived from a determination of
the issues at trial.
(The new language is italicized.)

*
It is difﬁcult to predict the extent to which, if
any, the amendments to the Tunney Act will cause
courts more often to reject or hold extensive hearings concerning proposed consent decrees. The
amendments expressly state that Tunney Act “shall
not be construed to require the court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing or to require the court to per-

*

*

*

*

*

*

The amendments we discuss above all have
potentially important consequences for businesses
and individuals affected by the U.S. antitrust laws.
It will remain to be seen how they change the dynamics of antitrust enforcement in practice.
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